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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 000356

SENSITIVE SIPDIS

S/CT FOR VICTOR NELSON, JANE MOSBACHER, BRYAN KOONTZ

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PTER PREL IN PK NP BG CE MV BT SUBJECT: RSI PROPOSALS: SOUTH ASIA

REF: SECSTATE 124641

11. (SBU) The following are 2010 Regional Security Initiative (RSI) program proposals for South Asia. Compiled by the RSI Coordinator at Embassy New Delhi, they include proposals covering Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and India.

12. (SBU) Regional Technical Conference(s)

Need for project: South Asia is one of the most terror-afflicted regions in the world, yet regional counterterrorism cooperation has lagged, impeded by regional political dynamics and long-standing bilateral tensions. India, in particular, has been reluctant to engage in regional cooperation involving Pakistan, which it has regarded as a source of support for terrorism. The November 26, 2008 attacks in Mumbai (known as "26/11") underscored that government officials in the region are ill equipped to deal with an enemy that increasingly has the capacity to commit large-scale attacks with minimal effort; governments often lag even further on preparedness for emerging threats. Recognizing these realities, Indian officials are increasingly open to regional cooperation on technical issues, as opposed to themes that touch on broader political issues. This technical cooperation is needed both to develop the capabilities of governments in the region, as well as to engage the regional heavyweight, India, in a regional approach to counterterrorism cooperation.

Description of the program proposed: In an effort to increase the capacity of law enforcement and government officials throughout South Asia, we propose a one week regional conference addressing a range of technical issues, including countering terrorist finance and narcotics, bioterrorism, and cyber security. The technical focus of these topics will avoid regional sensitivities while engaging key government officials with an urgent need to bolster their technical skills. This proposal could be executed through a series of smaller conferences, though we are proposing a single conference with break-out sessions for each topic to economize on conference expenses and to maximize the chances that governments will find something to like and agree to participate. We would invite technical specialists from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives to India to discuss their respective approaches to these issues and to raise awareness of these threats. Additionally, we would bring in expert speakers from outside the region to highlight global best practices and to suggest a program of further trainings and exchanges. A successful conference could lead to more detailed follow-on conferences on each of the technical issues and the emergence of a community of practice among regional technical specialists.

Time frame for implementation: Late 2010/Early 2011

Where implemented: New Delhi, India

Implementing body: U.S. Department of State, with expertise drawn from other agencies.

Audience of program: Approximately 42 regional participants representing law enforcement, financial intelligence units, drug interdiction agencies, first responders, and security agencies involved in bioterrorism prevention and disaster management.

Funding breakdown: (Note: costs would increase somewhat if separate conferences are held.)

Estimated Cost: \$108,916

Facilitator's travel/per diem/lodging: \$60,000 (\$3,000 per person x 20pp)

Flights for regional participants: \$31,500 (\$750 per person x 42pp)

New Delhi per diem: \$2,916 (\$486/day per person for 6 days) Facility rental costs: \$4,500

In-country costs (vehicle rental, etc): \$10,000

Tie to law enforcement: This conference is an effort to increase the technical abilities of law enforcement and government officials who require specialized technical skills to address and respond to bio terrorism, cyber terrorism, and terrorist finance, and narcotics.

Relation to RSI: By limiting the content to technical issues, this conference has the potential to engage all the countries in the region.

What have the S/CT sponsor so the program done to coordinate

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this program with this interagency? (What offices/agencies have been consulted? How did you ensure this is not duplicative?): The South Asia RSI Coordinator cleared this proposal with the other U.S. agencies present at Embassy New Delhi, as well as the other Embassies in the region.

## 13. (SBU) Regional Counterterrorism Training Center

Need for project: Unlike most other regions, South Asia lacks a consolidated regional training center in which law enforcement agencies can receive concurrent counterterrorism training to address common regional threats. A regional center in Bangladesh would provide a central training facility for law enforcement agencies from across South Asia. It would also encourage cooperation and communication among the various law enforcement agencies in South Asia and over

the various law enforcement agencies in South Asia and, over time, improve levels of trust and facilitate coordination. Australian CT coordinator Ambassador Bill Paterson briefed the UN Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) in Dhaka last November on a proposal to establish a regional law enforcement training center similar to the center in Jakarta.

In an effort to move this project forward, the European Union is sending a scoping team to Dhaka in February 2010 to assess the environment and sustainability of this type of training center. This type of regional CT training center is a large undertaking and, although the E.U. is taking the lead, they will look to donor countries to provide assistance to ensure the success of the facility. Due to the scope of this project, implementation will be phased, thereby providing an opportunity for funding to be approved in several tranches.

Description of program proposed: The program is a joint effort between the United States, European Union, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other potential donors. Bangladesh would provide land and facilities. The proposed program would provide funds to conduct a feasibility study; engage subject matter experts to advise the host government on the center's organization, personnel and logistic requirements; develop the initial curriculum; fund instructors; and support other start-up costs for the center.

Time frame for implementation: The target date for conducting the feasibility study is mid-year 2010, with a goal of conducting the first training programs in the following 12-18 months, depending on the identification of the center's location and pre-existing infrastructure.

Where implemented: Bangladesh hosts the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operation Training (BIPSOT), which provides United Nation Peacekeeping Operation training to contributing nations in the region, including Nepal, Maldives, China, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The United States enjoys good relations with Bangladesh and there is growing international support for locating the training center in Bangladesh, which would be accessible to and noncontroversial for countries across the region.

Implementing body: ICITAP would provide the subject matter experts to advise the Bangladesh government in the establishment of the center. Once operational, donor countries would finance training and provide instructors. Bangladesh's law enforcement agencies would have responsibility for operating the center. A governing board, if modeled on the Jakarta Center, would include seats for the primary donor countries, most likely the United States and European Union. A seat for a SAARC representative could help encourage regional participation.

Audience of program: The program would appeal to the various law enforcement agencies in South Asia. As the center matures, additional countries could be included in its training programs.

Funding breakdown: We request \$2 million, using ATA and CTE funds, to cover the feasibility study and provide an ICITAP subject-matter expert to assist establishing the training center. This can be broken into tranches based on how soon the funds would be needed: (i) funding for feasibility study (now until mid-2010), (ii) funding for subject matters experts to assess and advise on course content (mid to late 2010)), (iii) funding for training and classes (early to mid 2011).

Tie to law enforcement: Regional law enforcement is the program's primary focus.

Relation to RSI: The proposed center supports RSI objectives to increase regional law enforcement and counterterrorism capabilities and cooperation. The program would also build

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political will among participating nations to combat international terrorism and enhance trust and cooperation between law enforcement agencies in the region.

What have the S/CT sponsors of the project done to coordinate this program with this interagency?: Mission Dhaka's interagency counterterrorism working group discussed the proposal for the training center and consulted with UNCTED, UNDP, and the diplomatic missions of the EU, UK, Australia, Spain, Japan, Denmark, and other potential donors. A donors joint working group will coordinate efforts to avoid duplication. The RSI Coordinator in New Delhi cleared the proposal with other countries in the region.

## 14. (SBU) Regional Cyber Security Training

Need for project: South Asia is one of the most terror-afflicted regions in the world and also a global hub for information technology and services. The confluence of these realities, together with broader Asian power dynamics, makes the region particularly vulnerable to cyber terrorism, an increasingly serious threat to global security. Cyber attacks are not only disruptive and costly, but can also imperil critical infrastructure. Developing a robust cyber security cadre to thwart and respond to these attacks will bolster the safety and security of national infrastructure

and other interests. India, in particular, has identified cyber security as a priority in the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) concluded during Prime Minister Singh's state visit in November. Senior Indian officials have also stressed that cyber security is the kind of technical issue they would welcome addressing through a regional approach, something they have shied away from in the past.

Description of the program proposed: We propose sending a mixed group of officials from South Asian countries to attend cyber security training at United States Telecommunications Training Institute (USTTI) and to meet U.S. law enforcement and government officials tasked with securing the United States against cyber attacks. In an earlier proposal, five Indian officials were authorized to attend USTTI training. This program would expand to include officials from other countries in the region (with the exception of Pakistan), as well as consultations with U.S. officials. The attendees would participate in the Cyber Security Awareness Raising and Capacity Building course for one week, and spend a second week meeting U.S. officials at the Department of Defense, Federal Communications Commission, Department of State, and other agencies. (Note: Embassy Islamabad is already conducting cyber security training through  ${\tt DS/ATA}$  and expressed skepticism that Pakistan and India would cooperate on this issue.)

Time frame for implementation: October/November 2010, TBD. Specific dates would be based on the dates the course is offered.

Where implemented: The training would take place in the Washington, D.C. The RSI Coordinator at U.S. Embassy New Delhi would be the logistical point of contact for the event.

Implementing body: U.S. Department of State, in coordination with the United States Telecommunications Training Institute (USTTI), and other agencies.

Audience of program: Government officials from the regional countries (except Pakistan) with technical and law enforcement functions.

Funding breakdown: (Note: Based on six participant per country, except Pakistan. Numbers of participants could be scaled back to reduce costs.)
Total Cost: \$108,000

Roundtrip flights for 30: \$60,000 (\$2,000 per person)
Washington, D.C. per diem: \$96,180 (\$229/day per person for 14 days)

USTTI administrative cost: \$4,500 (\$150 per person) Incidentals: \$1,320

Tie to law enforcement: Law enforcement officials from the host governments with cyber security functions will be invited to attend.

Relation to RSI: This is a regional program to enhance the ability of government and law enforcement officials to counter cyber terror attacks.

What have the S/CT sponsor so the program done to coordinate this program with this interagency? (What offices/agencies

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have been consulted? How did you ensure this is not duplicative?): The South Asia RSI Coordinator cleared this proposal with the other U.S. agencies present at Embassy New Delhi, as well as the other Embassies in the South Asia region. This is an extension of a previously funded program.

15. (SBU) India-Pakistan Security Dialogue

Need for project: South Asia remains one of the most terror-afflicted regions of the world, but regional

approaches to counterterrorism have been inhibited by political dynamics and long-standing bilateral tensions. Official relations between India and Pakistan have been frozen since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, though unofficial contacts between think tanks and others have continued. As a matter of long-standing U.S. policy, the United States plays no official role in this dispute, which it regards as a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan to be worked out by the parties themselves; however, we continue to encourage them to do so through peaceful dialogue. Between official dialogue and public awareness efforts (like the recent 'Aman Ki Asha' campaign), there is considerable scope for unofficial, Track II engagement between think tanks and retired officials who retain considerable influence in official circles in each country. Adapting the successful model of the India-Bangladesh Strategic Dialogue, which contributed to an about-face in relations between India and its neighbor to the East, we propose supporting a Track II dialogue between think tanks in India and Pakistan to build trust and examine areas for potential cooperation.

Description of the program proposed: We propose funding two rounds of an India-Pakistan Track II dialogue to assess areas for possible engagement aimed at restarting official dialogue between the governments. The dialogue would be modeled after the successful India-Bangladesh Security Dialogue. Working through India's Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and a similar think tank in Pakistan we would bring together regional civil society leaders for meetings in New Delhi and Islamabad, or possibly a third country. Both organizations will be encouraged to share the conference recommendations with decision-makers in their respective countries.

Time frame for implementation: September 2010 \* January 2011

Where implemented: One round each in New Delhi and Islamabad, or possibly in a third country.

Implementing body: Observer Research Foundation (India) and a Pakistan based think tank (TBD).

Audience of program: Indian and Pakistani think tanks and opinion leaders, and indirectly government officials.

## Funding breakdown:

Total: \$100,000; each round would cost an estimated \$50,000.

Lodging: \$11,700 (3 days x 13 x US\$ 300)

Airfare: \$4,600 (\$460 x 10pp)
Direct Conference Costs: \$26,500
Conference Secretariat Costs: \$7,200

Tie to law enforcement: The dialogue addresses the capacity of the governments to prevent terrorism in South Asia, including law enforcement cooperation and capacity building.

Relation to RSI: This kind of focused bilateral dialogue is an important first step in developing regional approaches to counterterrorism cooperation, and no relationship in the region is more important when it comes to counterterrorism than this one.

What have the S/CT sponsor so the program done to coordinate this program with this interagency? (What offices/agencies have been consulted? How did you ensure this is not duplicative?) The South Asia RSI Coordinator cleared this proposal with the other U.S. agencies present at Embassy New Delhi, as well as the other Embassies in the South Asian region, including Embassy Islamabad.

16. (SBU) India-Bangladesh Security Dialogue (Rounds 3 & 4)

Need for project: South Asia remains one of the most terror-afflicted regions of the world, but regional approaches to counterterrorism have been inhibited by regional political dynamics and long-standing bilateral tensions. Improving bilateral relationships is an important first step toward developing a broader regional approach to

counterterrorism, as well as addressing localized terrorist threats. In this regard, the first round of the S/CT-funded

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India-Bangladesh Track II dialogue can be counted a tremendous success. This dialogue did much of the work behind the scenes to prepare for the breakthrough January 2010 visit of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheik Hasina to India, which resulted in five MoUs, three of them on counterterrorism cooperation. Bangladesh and India have resolved to work together to stem the movement of terrorists across their borders and to broadening their relationship. S/CT should continue its support for this unprecedented counterterrorism cooperation in a difficult region with two more rounds of Track II dialogue.

Description of the program proposed: We propose extending the successful India-Bangladesh South Asia Security Dialogue for two more rounds. Working through India's Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, the first rounds of the dialogue brought together regional civil society leaders, government officials and law enforcement agency representatives for dialogues in Dhaka. A second round is scheduled to take place in New Delhi in March 2010 with some government participation, making it more of a track one-and-a-half rather than just track two. To further develop this successful initiative, we propose funding a third and a fourth round of dialogue, in part to focus further attention on counterterrorism cooperation, to encourage more direct involvement from government officials, and to solidify this fruitful bilateral cooperation as a foundation for further regional cooperation.

Time frame for implementation: September 2010 \* January 2011

Where implemented: One additional round each between New Delhi, India and Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Implementing body: Observer Research Foundation (India) and Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (Bangladesh).

Audience of program: Indian and Bangladeshi think tanks, security agencies, police officers and governmental officials with equities in law enforcement and security.

## Funding breakdown:

Total: \$100,000; each round would cost an estimated \$50,000. Lodging: \$11,700 (3 days x 13 x US\$ 300)
Airfare: \$4,600 (\$460 x 10pp)
Direct Conference Costs: \$26,500
Conference Secretariat Costs: \$7,200

Tie to law enforcement: Members of the Security Council and law enforcement agencies from each country attended the first dialogue and are invited to the second round. The dialogue addresses the capacity of the governments to prevent terrorism in South Asia, including law enforcement cooperation and capacity building. The first round contributed to the conclusion of three counterterrorism and law enforcement-related MoUs during the visit of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheik Hasina to India, and there is scope for further progress.

Relation to RSI: This kind of focused bilateral dialogue is an important first step in developing regional approaches to counterterrorism cooperation.

What have the S/CT sponsor so the program done to coordinate this program with this interagency? (What offices/agencies have been consulted? How did you ensure this is not duplicative?) The South Asia RSI Coordinator cleared this proposal with the other U.S. agencies present at Embassy New Delhi, as well as the other Embassies in the South Asian region, including Embassy Dhaka. It is an extension of a previously funded program.

17. (SBU) Training for South Asian Governments in Countering Bulk Cash Smuggling

Need for project: Cutting off the financing of terrorist groups is a key component of our national strategy to combat terrorism. A large number of terrorist organizations operate in South Asia including, but not limited to, al-Qa'ida, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Tehrik\*i-Taliban), Harakat ul-Jihad-i-islami/Bangladesh, Harakat ul-Jihad-Islami, Harakat ul-Mujahedin, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar I Jhangvi. In order to operate and grow, these groups depend on and receive funding from outside sources including wealthy donors and grass root organizations in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and other Gulf and Islamic states. Much of this funding is smuggled across regional borders. In order to detect and stop the flow of cash and other illicit items across the borders, the USG needs to assist South Asian

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governments in building their border enforcement capacity. The creation of robust border enforcement regimes in South Asia is important to reaching our counterterrorism goals of denying funding to terrorist networks.

Description of the program proposed: The USG will seek to build financial investigative capacity, strengthen border control and increase regional cooperation by training key government agencies from Afghanistan, Pakistan, UAE, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. This will be a two-year, two-phase project that will be provided to customs and border control agencies to strengthen their capacity to investigate and interdict bulk cash smugglers and bulk cash couriers at all ports of entry including land crossings, ports and airports. The first phase of the project will include a regional Bulk Cash Smuggling (BCS) course and a Regional Operational Cash Courier course. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will provide these courses, which are designed to build capacity to target, detect, interdict and investigate cash couriers. The second phase of the program will be a "Train the Trainer" course to establish advanced training divisions and experts within host countries to train personnel on the detection, interdiction and investigation of illicit cash couriers and BCS.

Time frame for implementation: 2010-2011.

Where implemented: United Arab Emirates.

Implementing body: Department of Homeland Security/ICE and CBP.

Audience of program: Customs, border protection, federal investigative agencies, Financial Intelligence Units, Air and Port Authority Police/Border Guards from Pakistan, Afghanistan, UAE, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal

Funding breakdown:
Total: \$250,000
FY 10 - Basic and Advanced BCS courses: \$150,000
FY 11- Train the Trainer Course: \$100,000

Tie to law enforcement: The program will strengthen the capacities of law enforcement agencies to stop illicit financing of terrorist groups.

18. (SBU) Training for South Asia Financial Intelligence Units

Need for project: Cutting off the financing of terrorist groups is a key component of our national strategy to combat terrorism. A large number of terrorist organizations operate in South Asia including, but not limited to al-Qa'ida (AQ), Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT), Tehrik\*i-Taliban (TTP), Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Harakat ul-Jihad-Islami (HUJI), Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), and Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ). In order

to operate and grow, these groups depend on and receive funding from outside sources including wealthy donors and grass root organizations in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Gulf and Islamic states. Building the capacity of governments in South Asian countries to stem the flow of funds to terrorist groups is essential to disrupting their activities. The creation of robust financial investigative capabilities in South Asia is critical to reaching our counterterrorism goals.

Description of the program proposed: In an effort to build financial investigative capacity and increase CT cooperation in South Asia, we propose regional training through conferences/seminars and exchange programs for Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal. We propose building the capacities of the FIUs through 1) regional conferences/seminars and 2) training and exchange programs. Bangladesh, Maldives, and Sri Lanka have the most advanced financial investigate capacities in the region and therefore should host the conferences/seminars. However, none of the South Asian countries have met all the standards and requirements necessary for admission to the Egmont Group. Therefore, representatives from other countries that have met Egmont Group requirements and are internationally recognized as having robust Counter Terrorist Finance (CTF) regimes such as Australia, Singapore,

Thailand and Malaysia would be invited to participate in the training. Other presenters at the conference/seminar could include multilateral organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) regional body, the Asia Pacific Group and the Egmont Group. The seminars/conference would provide training in financial investigation techniques. The second phase of this project would include an exchange

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program between FIU officials from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Nepal with FIUs in Australia, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. This would include hands-on practical training in financial investigations.

Time frame for implementation: 2010-2011. The first year would be a conference or series of seminars and second year would be the exchange program.

Where implemented: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Australia, Singapore, Thailand or Malaysia.

Implementing body: Department of Treasury.

Audience of program: Officials from FIUs from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Australia, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia.

Funding breakdown:
Total: \$300,000
Conference/Seminars: \$150,000
Exchange Program: \$150,000

Tie to law enforcement: Building the capacities of financial investigations is necessary in order law enforcement agencies to stop illicit financing of terrorist groups and to try terror financing and money laundering cases in their judicial systems.

19. (SBU) Support for Enactment by Pakistan of AML/CTF Legislation, in compliance with Asia pacific Group 2009 Mutual Evaluation Recommendations.

Need for project: Pakistan's legislature is coming close to finally enacting a long-awaited anti-money laundering law. On January 27, the National Assembly adopted the Anti-Money Laundering Bill 2009. The progress was, in large part, a response to international pressures, including the detailed criticism by the regional FATF body, the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), in its 2009 Mutual Evaluation

Report (MER). While the new legislation is an important step, it falls short of providing for a comprehensive Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Terrorist Financing (AML/CTF) legal regime in full compliance with international standards. Pakistan seeks admission to the Egmont Group, and eligibility will depend on enactment of further amendments and revisions to the new AML legislation. These efforts must be completed in advance of May 2011, the next opportunity for Egmont review.

Description of the program proposed: Background: Pakistan's on-again/off-again efforts at enacting and implementing an AML/CTF regime have been half-hearted at best. After years of delay, the government finally issued, by executive order, an AML Ordinance in 2007. The Ordinance was reissued, with some additional amendments, in November 2009 -- constituting the version now enacted by Parliament. Some additional AML provisions have also been included in the country's anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism legislation. The legislation as passed, however, falls short of international standards and requirements necessary for admission to the Egmont Group. For example, the law still requires that a bilateral mutual legal assistance agreement (MLAA) be in place before Pakistan can engage in international cooperation or share evidence concerning money laundering investigations or prosecutions.

Accordingly, further "tweaking" of the new AML legislation will be required. Pakistan's legislature, however, remains a largely dysfunctional institution, capricious in its attention, and ineffectual in pursuing its agendas. The challenge will be to keep key government officials and ministries focused on the need for refinement of the new AML legislation, so that they, in turn, can continue to exert pressure on the legislature. (Programming Note: Direct participation in the legislative drafting process in Pakistan has not proved to be generally feasible for USG or Embassy personnel—or for other international institutions or partners—regardless of subject matter area. Accordingly programs aimed at influencing the legislative process will need to work through a combination of "sideways" efforts including development of personal relationships, provisions of technical expertise, and engagement of third country partners to provide comparative models.)

Post proposes funding efforts designed to promote and encourage amendments to the new legislation to bring it into full compliance with FATF requirements, consistent with the clear recommendations of the APG MER and necessary as a precursor to Egmont review in 2011. The Program would use

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periodic U.S. Department of Justice Intermittent Legal Advisors (ILAs), with substantive background in AML/CTF legislation, assigned to post on a TDY-basis, working with Post's Resident Legal Advisor (DOJ), Treasury Attach and with the NAS, POL and ECON Sections. The ILAs would be tasked with implementing the following efforts designed to maintain momentum and pressure for enactment of AML/CTF laws through:

-- Mobilization of regional resources and models from across the APG, to promote compliance with APG MER recommendation and to emphasize reforms still necessary to satisfy Egmont review. While South Asia as a region has noticeably lagged in the area of AML/CTF enforcement, many Southeast Asian nations, notably Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, have been regional leaders in these efforts. The ILAs would facilitate engagement of Pakistani officials and parliamentarians with regional counterparts, through regional events and programs, and through the organization of study visits by Pakistani officials, including parliamentarians, to Egmont member countries with successful AML/CTF legislative regimes.

--Continued direct efforts by ILAs at "lobbying" of relevant Pakistani officials, across the Pakistani interagency and in

Parliament, on the need for further revision of the AML law, through one-on-one meetings, provision of relevant reference and resource materials, and clarification and reinforcement of APG's MER recommendations. Many Parliamentarians, for example, are poorly schooled in issues relating to AML/CTF, but are not always an easy group to corral into a large conference setting; the ILAs would use direct meetings or small group sessions to break down current apathy and resistance to further consideration and enactment of the AML/CTF amendments.

--Facilitate participation of US and international AML experts in programs in Pakistan designed to promote further modification of the new AML/CTF regime, including both small, focused workshops and larger conferences. As has been the case in other settings, DOJ ILAs would enlist direct involvement of DOJ's Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section (AFMLS) -- the lead office in the USG for AML legislative policy coordination. ILAs would also work with appropriate embassy officials to coordinate efforts with other international donors working in the AML/CTF area, including Asian Development Bank and UNODC.

Time frame for implementation: 2010-2011

Where implemented: Islamabad, with regional visits/programs to appropriate counterpart countries and venues in South and Southeast Asia.

Implementing body: At Post Islamabad: DOJ Resident Legal Advisor and NAS Section. Supported by DOJ Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), Washington, DC.

Audience of program: Pakistani Parliamentarians, legislative staff, and relevant officials from Ministries of Law and Justice, Interior and Finance.

Funding breakdown:

Total: \$600,000 for eighteen months
Intermittent Legal Advisors (2-3 month TDY): \$300,000
In country (Pakistan) workshops/conferences (including travel costs for experts): \$150,000
Regional conferences/study tours: \$150,000

Tie to law enforcement: Sound and comprehensive AML/CTF legislation is the building block on which all law enforcement efforts are based. At present, Pakistani lacks such a fully adequate legal framework. The lack of effective laws is reflected in the weak record of Pakistani law enforcement in pursuing such cases. Legal reform is a critical component of larger efforts to promote more aggressive AML/CTF enforcement efforts in Pakistan. Such reform is also a precursor for Egmont membership -- which, in turn, is a vehicle for greater international cooperation in building AML/CTF cases.